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Avoid plagiarism
On January 14, 2011, Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano made it official: the
Virtual Fence Project was to be officially canceled. In her statement explaining the decision,
Napolitano cited the difficulty of creating a unified, fully integrated security system and
promised to “pursue a new path forward.” What was left unsaid were the reasons that led
to the final decision—principally, a too-complicated technical system that did not work
and was leading to ballooning costs.
Illegal crossing into the United States along the Mexican border has reached epidemic
proportions in recent years. Fear of drug smuggling, illegal aliens, and possible terrorist
incursions have made the issue of homeland security one of the major “hot buttons” in the
political arena, both in Washington, DC and in states located along the southern border, as
well as those in proximity to Canada. The problem is compounded by the sheer sizes of the
borders involved. The Mexico/U.S border runs for nearly 2,000 miles, much of it across
desert wastelands and other inhospitable and remote areas. Establishing any sort of border
security in the wake of the 9/11 attacks is a national necessity, but it is a daunting and
difficult task.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was organized following the attacks on the
World Trade Center towers, and is charged with the responsibility of securing all borders
and points of illegal entry into the United States in cooperation with Customs and Border
Protection. As part of its mandate, it has developed plans for creating a more secure and
stable border with Mexico to prevent the flow of undocumented immigrants, drugs, and
potential terrorists. For the first stage in this process, DHS proposed a project to physically
and electronically seal the stretch of the desert between the United States and Mexico under
a multibillion-dollar contract named the Secure Border Initiative Net (SBInet). President
Bush in May 2006 called SBInet “the most technologically advanced border security
initiative in American history.” A 28-mile stretch of desert, centered on Nogales, Arizona,
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was to be the pilot stage in a project that eventually would be used to monitor and control
some 6,000 miles of border with both Mexico and Canada.
In late 2006, Boeing was selected as the major contractor for the SBInet project. Although
better known for its military weapon systems, Boeing’s Integrated Defense Systems Unit
was made responsible for overall coordination of a massive system of towers as well as
listening devices, motion sensors, cameras, and radar to be used to detect and help
apprehend illegal immigrants crossing the border. In fact, the U.S. government chose to
outsource the entire project to private firms, expecting that contractors would design the
program’s elements, build them, and then handle full oversight of their own work.
In a nutshell, the system used a chain of 100-foottall towers that each scanned a 360-degree
radius for a distance of 10 miles. Ground radar sensors also attempted to detect footsteps,
bicycles, and vehicles. The first $20 million pilot phase, named Project 28 after the length
of the part of the desert that it was supposed to cover, was to be completed by mid-June
2007. Boeing selected more than 100 subcontractors to build various components of the
system, with its project managers maintaining overall control of the development process.
Unfortunately, its structure was unwieldy, and the project was further compromised by
the sheer number of distinct elements and technical systems Boeing was attempting to
integrate. The technical challenge of integrating systems including watch towers, sensors,
radar, and specialized cameras was beyond anything Boeing had attempted before. The
problem was particularly noteworthy when we consider that integration, in many ways,
was the project. The various technical elements were difficult but attainable. The challenge
for SBInet lay in the ability of Boeing to find a means to bring all these new and unproven
technologies together under one umbrella. So complicated was the challenge, in fact, that
the virtual fence failed a series of initial tests, significantly delaying the full deployment of
Project 28.
Unfortunately, these technical and coordination problems were never resolved. In the
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nearly three years after original testing was done on one section of the fence, SBInet had
cost the government $672 million dollars, with the end nowhere in sight. Although the total
project cost was anticipated at $1.1 billion, congressional watchdog groups argued that the
final cost of the project could soar to over $30 billion. Costs, in fact, were a sore point with
the project from the time it was bid. Originally promising to complete SBInet for $1.1
billion, Boeing’s revised estimates went to $2.5 billion and then, just a few months later, to
$8 billion. This rapid escalation of projected costs finally prompted a congressional
oversight committee hearing, in which Boeing endured withering criticism from
representatives who questioned its motives in asking for more money and time to complete
the project. In the meantime, beset by continuing problems, Boeing had also revised its
estimates for the completion date to 2016, more than seven years after the date in the
original plan.
A major concern was Boeing’s pyramid-like management structure that critics said caused
confusion and a lack of clear responsibility. Worse, it made it easier for hidden costs to be
charged to the project. Because Boeing embedded multiple subcontracting layers in the
Virtual Fence development, it was able to add charges at each level. The larger problem
was the clear conflict of interest that emerged by placing Boeing in charge of project
oversight, while allowing them to manage subcontractors and monitor the progress of the
project. Not surprisingly, with this configuration little information came to light about cost
overruns or schedule slippages until quality and overrun problems were simply too large
to ignore . . . or hide.
Admittedly, the problems that sank the SBInet project were complicated and came from
multiple sources. Besides the technical challenges of managing 100 subcontractors, all
required to provide critical components that Boeing would integrate, the project had
effectively shut out most federal agencies and oversight groups. It was difficult to get
accurate project status information given the government’s decision to “farm out” border
security to private contractors. As a result, congressional investigators found that
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Homeland Security officials were simply standing by while Boeing provided information
that was “replete with unexplained anomalies, thus rendering the data unfit for effective
contractor management and oversight.” Furthermore, many critics questioned the
feasibility of the original intent of the project itself, wondering about the likelihood of ever
effectively sealing a border that runs through some of the most inhospitable terrain in
North America. Whether through a combination of poor oversight, over-optimistic scope
expectations, or simple inability to make this cutting-edge technology work, SBInet
remains an example of a significant program failure at the taxpayer’s expense.
Questions
1. What problems do you see emerging from a project such as SBInet where the
government allows the contractor to determine scope, manage all contractor relations,
and decide how to share project status information with oversight bodies?
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2. Consider the following two arguments: “The failure of SBInet was due to poor scope
management” versus “SBInet failed because of poor oversight and project controls.”
Take one side or the other in this argument, and justify your response.
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3. With the current publicity surrounding the intentions of the Trump administration to
begin building a wall along the border with Mexico, identify three lessons from this
case that could help with that development process. In other words, if you were to advise
the Trump White House on major lessons to absorb as it considers beginning its own
fence, what would they be?
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